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Abstract
In this paper, we look at the property of secrecy through the growth of the protocol. Intuitively,
an increasing protocol preserves the secret. For that, we need functions to estimate the security of
messages. Here, we give relaxed conditions on the functions and on the protocol and we prove that an
increasing protocol is correct when analyzed with functions that meet these conditions.
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1 Introduction
Checking security in cryptographic protocols is a hard task [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The problem is in general
undecidable [4, 5, 7, 8, 9]. However, a number of semi-decidable verification methods have emerged
in the last decades working on several axes [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Others are decidable but
under strict conditions [18, 19, 20]. In this paper, we look at the property of secrecy in a protocol by
observing its monotony. By intuition, an increasing protocol protects its secret inputs. This means, if
the security of every atomic message does not decrease during its life cycle in the protocol (between all
receiving and sending steps), the secret is never uncovered. For that, we have to define safe metrics to
reasonably estimate the security of any atomic message. This way of approaching secrecy in protocols
has been adopted in few prior works. For instance, Steve Schneider in [21] proposed the rank-functions as
safe metrics to verify protocols in CSP [22, 23]. These functions successfully managed to analyze several
classical protocols like the Needham-Schroeder protocol. However, such verification dictates the protocol
implementation in CSP. Besides, building rank-functions for every protocol is not an effortless task and
their existence is not guaranteed [24]. In [14] Abadi, by using Spi-Calculus [25, 26], stipulates that: "If a
protocol typechecks, then it keeps its secrets". For that, he forces the exchangedmessages to have formally
the following types: {secret, public, any, confounder} in order to easily estimate the security of every
message from its type. Although this approach is simple and elegant, it cannot verify protocols that had
been implemented with no respect to this logic. Alike, Houmani et al. [27, 28, 29, 30] defined universal
functions called interpretation functions that were able to verify protocols statically. They operate on
an abstraction of the protocol called generalized roles in a role-based specification [31, 32, 15]. An
interpretation function must meet few conditions to be considered safe for analysis. Obviously, less we
have restrictions on functions, easier we can build instances of them and more we have possibilities to
prove protocols secure since one function might fail to prove the security of a protocol but another may
succeed. In this regard, we notice that the conditions on the Houmanis’ interpretation functions were so
restrictive that very few functions were proposed in practice and proved safe. In this respect, we believe
that the condition of full-invariance by substitution, which is a property key that allows any decision made
on messages of the generalized roles (messages with variables) to be exported to valid traces (closed
messages), is the most restrictive one. Since the aim of our approach is to build several functions, we
think that if we release functions from this condition we can reach this goal.
2 Notations
Here, we give some conventions that we use in this paper.
+ We denote by C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 the context of verification including the parameters that
affect a protocol analysis:
• M : is a set of messages built from the algebraic signature 〈N ,Σ〉 whereN is a set of atomic
names (nonces, keys, principals, etc.) and Σ is a set of defined functions (enc:: encryption,
dec:: decryption, pair:: concatenation (denoted by "." here), etc.). i.e. M = T〈N ,Σ〉(X ). We
denote by Γ the set of all substitutions fromX →M. We denote byA the atomic messages in
M, by A(m) the set of atomic messages (atoms) inm and by I the set of agents (principals)
including the intruder I . We denote by k−1 the reverse form of a key k and we assume that
(k−1)−1 = k.
• ξ : is the equational theory that expresses the algebraic properties of the functions defined in
Σ by equations. e.g. dec(enc(x, y), y−1) = x.
• |=C : is the inference system of the intruder under the equational theory ξ. Let M be a set
of messages and m be a message. M |=C m expresses that the intruder can infer m fromM
using her capacity. We extend this notation to valid traces as follows: ρ |=C m means that
the intruder can deducem from the messages in the trace ρ. We assume that the intruder has
the full control of the net as described in the Dolev-Yao model [33]. She may redirect, delete
and modify any message. She holds the public keys of all participants, her private keys and
the keys that she shares with other participants. She can encrypt or decrypt any message with
the keys that she holds. Formally, the intruder has generically the following rules for building
messages:
(int) : 
M|=Cm
[m ∈M ∪K(I)]
(op) :M|=Cm1,...,M|=Cmn
M|=Cf(m1,...,mn)
[f ∈ Σ]
(eq) :M|=Cm
′,m′=Cm
M|=Cm
, with (m′ =C m ≡ m
′ =ξ(C) m)
• K : is a function from I to M. It returns for an agent a set of atomic messages describing
her initial knowledge. We denote byKC(I) the initial knowledge of the intruder, or justK(I)
where the context is clear.
• L⊒ : is the lattice of security (L,⊒,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) that we use to assign security levels to mes-
sages. An example of a lattice is (2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅) that we use in this paper.
• p.q : is a partial function that attributes a level of security (type) to a message inM. Letm be
a message andM be a set of messages. We write pMq ⊒ pmq when ∃m′ ∈M.pm′q ⊒ pmq
+ Our analysis operates in a role-based specification. A role-based specification is a set of generalized
roles. A generalized role is a protocol abstraction where the emphasis is put on some principal and
where all the unknownmessages, that could not be verified, are replaced by variables. An exponent
i (the session identifier) is added to a fresh message to express that this component changes values
from one execution to another. A generalized role expresses how an agent sees and understands the
exchanged messages. A generalized role may be extracted from a protocol by these steps:
1. We extract the roles from a protocol.
2. We replace the unknown messages by fresh variables in each role.
Roles can be extracted following these steps:
1. For every principal, we extract all the steps in which she participates. Then, we add a session
identifier i in the steps identifiers and in fresh values.
For example, from the variation of the Woo-Lam protocol given in Table 1, we extract three
roles, denoted by RA (for the agent A), RB (for the agent B), and RS (for the server S).
2. We introduce an intruder I to express the fact that received messages and sent messages are
perhaps received or sent by an intruder.
3. Finally, we extract all prefixes from these roles. A prefix must end by a sending step.
p = 〈1, A→ B : A〉.
〈2, B → A : Nb〉.
〈3, A→ B : {Nb.kab}kas〉.
〈4, B → S : {A.{Nb.kab}kas}kbs〉.
〈5, S → B : {Nb.kab}kbs〉.
Table 1 – The Woo-Lam Protocol
From the roles, we define the generalized roles. A generalized role is an abstraction of a role where
unknown messages are converted to variables. Indeed, a message or a component of a message is
replaced by a variable when the receiver cannot make any verification on it and so she is not sure
about its integrity or its origin. The generalized roles give an accurate idea on the behavior and the
knowledge of participants during the protocol execution. The generalized roles of A are:
A1G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : A〉
A2G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : A〉.
〈i.2, I(B) → A : X〉.
〈i.3, A → I(B) : {X.kiab}kas〉
The generalized roles of B are:
B1G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : Nb〉
B2G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : Nb〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : Y 〉.
〈i.4, B → I(S) : {A.Y }kbs 〉
B3G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : Nb〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : Y 〉.
〈i.4, B → I(S) : {A.Y }kbs 〉.
〈i.5, I(S) → B : {N ib .Z}kbs 〉
The generalized role of S is:
S1G = 〈i.4, I(B) → S : {A, {U, V }kas}kbs〉.
〈i.5, S → I(B) : {U.V }kbs 〉
Hence, the role-based specification of the protocol described by Table 1 isRG(p) = {A
1
G, A
2
G, B
1
G, B
2
G, B
3
G, S
1
G}.
The role-based specification is a model to formalize the cencept of valid traces of a protocol. More
details about the role-based specification are in [34, 31, 32, 15].
+ A valid trace is an instantiated messages of the generalized roles where each message sent by the
intruder can be generated by her using her capacity and the prior messages. We denote by [[p]] the
set of valid traces of p.
+ We denote byMGp the set of messages with variables generated byRG(p), byMp the set of closed
messages generated by substituting all variables in MGp . We denote by R
+ (resp. R−) the set of
sent messages (resp. received messages) by a honest agent in the role R. By convention, we use
the uppercase letters for sequences or sets of elements and the lowercase for single elements. For
example m denotes a single message, M a set of messages, R a role of composite steps, r a step
and R.r a role ending by the step r.
3 Secrecy in Increasing Protocols
In this section, we give relaxed conditions allowing a function to be reliable for analysis. We prove
that an increasing protocol is correct with respect to secrecy when analyzed with such functions.
Definition 3.1. (Well-Formed Function)
Let F be a function and C be a context of verification. F is C-well-formed iff:
∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈ A(M):


F (α, {α}) = ⊥
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
For an atom α in a set of messagesM , a well-formed function returns the bottom value "⊥" if M =
{α} (clear). It returns the top value "⊤" if it does not appear in this set. It returns for it in the union of
two sets, the minimum "⊓" of the two values calculated in each set separately.
Definition 3.2. (Full-invariant-by-intruder Function)
Let F be a function and C be a context of verification.
F is C-full-invariant-by-intruder iff:
∀M ⊆M,m ∈M.M |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq)
A full-invariant-by-intruder F should be such that it it attributes a security level to a message α in
M , the intruder can never produce from M another message m that decrease this level (i.e. F (α,m) ⊒
F (α,M)) except when α is intended to be known by the intruder (i.e. pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
Definition 3.3. (Reliable Function)
Let F be a function and C be a context of verification. F is C-reliable iff :
F is C−well-formed ∧ F is C−full-invariant-by-intruder.
A reliable function is simply a function that is well-formed and full-invariant-by-intruder in a given
context of verification C.
Definition 3.4. (F -Increasing Protocol)
Let F be a function, C be a context of verification and p be a protocol. p is F -increasing in C if:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀σ ∈ Γ : X →Mp we have:
∀α ∈ A(M).F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ)
A F -increasing protocol produces valid traces (interleaving of substituted messages in generalized
roles) where every involved principal (every substituted generalized role) never decreases the security
levels, calculated by F , of received components.
Definition 3.5. (Secret Disclosure)
Let p be a protocol and C be a context of verification.
We say that p discloses a secret α ∈ A(M) in C if:
∃ρ ∈ [[p]].(ρ |=C α) ∧ (pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq)
A secret disclosure consists in manipulating a valid trace ρ by the intruder, using her knowledgeK(I)
in a context of verification C, to infer a secret α that she is not intended to know (pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq).
Lemma 3.6.
Let F be a C-reliable function and p a F -increasing protocol. We have: ∀m ∈ M.[[p]] |=C m ⇒
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq)
See the proof 4 in [35].
The lemma 3.6 states that for any atom α in a message generated by an increasing protocol, its security
level calculated by a reliable function is always greater than its initial value given in the context, provided
that the intruder is not initially allowed to know it. Indeed, initially the atom has a some security level.
This level cannot be decreased by the intruder using her initial knowledge and received messages since a
reliable function is full-invariant-by-intruder. In each new step of the evolution of the valid trace, involved
messages are better protected since the protocol is increasing. The proof is run by induction on the size
(evolution) of the trace and uses the properties of reliability of the function in every new step of the
induction.
Theorem 3.7. (Security of Increasing Protocols)
Let F be a C-reliable function and p a F -increasing protocol.
p is C-correct with respect to secrecy.
Proof.
Let’s suppose that p reveals some atomic secret α.
From the definition 3.5 we have:
∃ρ ∈ [[p]].(ρ |=C α) ∧ (pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq) (1)
Since F is C-reliable and p is an F -increasing protocol, we have from the lemma 3.6:
(F (α, α) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (2)
From (1) and (2) we deduce:
F (α, α) ⊒ pαq (3)
As F is C-well-formed, we have:
F (α, α) = ⊥ (4)
From (3) and (4) we deduce:
⊥ = pαq (5)
(5) is not possible because it is opposite to: pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq in (1).
Conclusion: p is C-correct with respect to secrecy.
4 Comparison with Related Works
The theorem 3.7 states that an increasing protocol is correct with respect to secrecy when analyzed
with a function that is well-formed and full-invariant by intruder, or shortly reliable. Compared to the
conditions imposed by Houmani et al. in [27, 30] to their functions, we have one condition less. Indeed,
Houmani et al. expect from a protocol to be increasing on the messages of generalized roles whatever
the substitutions they may receive (when the protocol is running) and demanded from the interpretation
function to resist to these substitutions. As a result, even if they gave a guideline to build reliable functions,
just two functions could be really built: the function DEK and the function DEKAN. We notice as well
that the function DEK is disappointing in practice. That is mainly due to the complexity to prove that a
function satisfies the full-invariance by substitution property. In this paper, we release our functions from
this hard condition in order to be more comfortable in building functions. We rehouse this condition in our
new definition of an increasing protocol. The problem of substitution goes to the protocol and becomes
relatively less difficult to handle. Our approach has in common with Schneider’s method and Houmani’s
method the idea of transforming the problem of secrecy to a problem of protocol growth. All of these
three approaches decide only if the protocol is proved increasing using a reliable function, as well.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Releasing a function from a condition may motivate us to undertake special cautions when using
it. In a future work, we introduce the notion of witness-functions to analyze cryptographic protocols.
A witness-function is a protocol-dependent function. It introduces new derivation techniques to solve
the problem of substitution locally in the protocol. It supplies two bounds that are independent of all
substitutions which enables any decision made on the generalized roles to be sent to valid traces. This
replaces the restrictive condition of full-invariance by substitution in Houmani’s logic. The witness-
functions were successful to prove secrecy in many protocols. They could even tell about flaws.
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RELAXED CONDITIONS FOR SECRECY IN CRYPTOGRAPHIC
PROTOCOLS: PROOFS AND INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
by: Jaouhar Fattahi, Mohamed Mejri and Hanane Houmani- April 2014
Valid trace
Before defining a valid trace, let’s give some intermediate definitions.
1- Step: it is defined by the following BNF grammar:
step :: 〈j.i, A −→ I(B) : m〉|〈j.i, I(a) −→ B : m〉
where j is the identifier of the session and i is the identifier of the step.
2- Trace: a trace ρ is a sequence of steps. It is defined by the following BNF grammar:
ρ :: ε | step | ρ.step
where ε is the empty trace. We denote by ρ¯ all the steps of ρ.
3- Session identifier: every step has an identifier. The set of identifiers Sρ associated with a trace ρ is
built as follows:
Sε = ∅
Sρ.〈j.i,A−→I(B):m〉 = Sρ ∪ {j}
Sρ.〈j.i,I(a)−→B:m〉 = Sρ ∪ {j}
4- Session: a trace is an interleaving of many sessions where each of them has an identifier. We define
a session (identified by Id) associated with a trace ρn (coming from an interleaving of many sessions) as
follows:
εId = ε
(ρ.〈j.i, A −→ I(B) : m〉)Id = ρId if Id 6= j
(ρ.〈j.i, I(a) −→ B : m〉)Id = ρId if Id 6= j
(ρ.〈Id.i, A −→ I(B) : m〉)Id = ρId.〈Id.i, A −→ I(B) : m〉
(ρ.〈Id.i, I(a) −→ B : m〉)Id = ρId.〈Id.i, I(a) −→ B : m)〉
where ε is the empty trace. It may be eliminated when preceded or followed by a non-empty trace.
5- Def/Use: the knowledge of the intruder change from a step to another. After an execution of a
trace, the intruder acquires new knowledge or defines herself news messages. We denote by Def(ρ) the
knowledge (messages) received by the intruder after execution of a trace ρ, and by Use(ρ) the messages
she builds after the execution of ρ. Use(ρ) and Def(ρ) are defined as follows:
Def(ε) = ∅
Def(ρ.〈j.i, A −→ I(B) : m〉) = Def(ρ) ∪ {m}
Def(ρ.〈j.i, I(a) −→ B : m〉) = Def(ρ)
Use(ε) = ∅
Use(ρ.〈j.i, A −→ I(B) : m〉) = Use(ρ)
Use(ρ.〈j.i, I(a) −→ B : m〉) = Use(ρ) ∪ {m}
For the sake of simplification, we denote by:
Use(ρ) = ρ+ and Def(ρ) = ρ−
6- C-well-defined trace: a trace is said C-well-defined when the intruder is able to define all the
messages contained in the trace before sending them. i.e for ρ = ρ1.e.ρ2 we have:
ρ1
+ |=K(I) e
−
where e is a step of communication andK(I) are the knowledge of the intruder.
7- C-well-formed trace: a trace is said C-well-formed when it is generated by substitution in a gen-
eralized role of the protocol. i.e. ∃r ∈ RG(p), a session i ∈ Sρ and a substitution σ ∈ Γ (the set of all
substitutions) such that:
ρi = rσ
8- Valid trace: ρ is a valide trace of a protocol p when ρ is C-well-defined and ρ is C-well-formed.
A valide trace is a run of a protocol. It is an instance of the generalized roles produced by the intruder
(or a regular agent) with respect to the rules of the protocol and the context of verification.
Definition 5.1. (Prefix of a trace)
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be two traces.
ρ2 is a prefix of ρ1 if ∃ρ3 such that: ρ1 = ρ2.ρ3
Definition 5.2. (Size of a trace)
The size of a trace ρ denoted by |ρ| is defined as follows:
|ε| = 0
|step| = 1
|ρ.ρ′| = |ρ|+ |ρ′|
Definition 5.3. (Well-formed function)
Let F be a function and C a context of verification.
F is well-formed in C if:
∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈ A(M):


F (α, {α}) = ⊥
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
For an atom α in a set of messages M , a well-formed function returns the bottom value "⊥", if
M = {α}. It returns for it in the union of two sets, the minimum "⊓" of the two values calculated in each
set separately. It returns the top value "⊤", if it does not appear in this set.
Definition 5.4. (Full-invariant-by-intruder function)
Let F be a function and C a context of verification.
F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C if:
∀M ⊆M,m ∈M.M |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq)
A reliable functionF should be full-invariant-by-intruder. That is to say, if F attributes a security level
to a message α inM , then the intruder can never produce fromM another messagem that decrease this
level (i.e. F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M)) except when α is intended to be known by the intruder (i.e. pK(I)q ⊒
pαq).
Definition 5.5. (Reliable function)
Let F be a function and C a context of verification.
F is C-reliable if F is well-formed and F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C.
A reliable function is simply a function that is well-formed and full-invariant-by-intruder in a given
context of verification C.
Definition 5.6. (F -increasing protocol)
Let F be a function, C a context of verification and p a protocol.
p is F -increasing in C if:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀σ ∈ Γ : X →Mp we have:
∀α ∈ A(M).F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ)
A F -increasing protocol produces valid traces (interleaving of substituted generalized roles) where
every involved principal (every substituted generalized role) never decreases the security levels of received
components. When a protocol is F -increasing and F is a reliable function, it will be easy to prove its
correctness with respect to the secrecy property. In fact, if every agent appropriately protects her sent
messages (if she initially knows the security level of a component, she has to encrypt it with at least one
key having a similar or higher security level, and if she does not know its security level, she estimates it
using a reliable function), the intruder can never reveal it.
Definition 5.7. (Secret disclosure)
Let p be a protocol and C a context of verification.
We say that p discloses a secret α ∈ A(M) in C if:
∃ρ ∈ [[p]].(ρ |=C α) ∧ (pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq)
A secret disclosure consists in exploiting a valid trace of the protocol (denoted by [[p]]) by the intruder
using her knowledgeK(I) in a context of verification C, to infer a secret α that she is not allowed to know
(expressed by: pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq).
Definition 5.8. (C-correct protocol with respect to the secrecy property)
Let p be a protocol and C a context of verification.
p is C-correct with respect to the secrecy property if:
∀α ∈ A(M), ∀ρ ∈ [[p]].ρ |=C α⇒ pK(I)q ⊒ pαq
We denote:
∀α ∈ A(M).[[p]] |=C α⇒ pK(I)q ⊒ pαq
A correct protocol is such that any valid trace ρ that it produces never leaks a secret that the intruder
is not allowed to know.
Definition 5.9. (⊒F )
Let C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 be a verification context.
Let F be a function.
LetM1,M2 ⊆M.
M1 ⊒F M2 ⇐⇒ ∀α ∈ A(M1).F (α,M1) ⊒ F (α,M2)
Definition 5.10. (Auxiliary function)
Let C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 be a verification context.
Let F be a function.
We define the auxiliary function of F , denoted by Fˆ , as follows:
Fˆ : A×M 7−→ L⊒
(α,m) 7−→ pαq ⊓ F (α,m)
Definition 5.11. (⊒
Fˆ
)
Let C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 be a verification context.
Let F be a function.
LetM1,M2 ⊆M
M1 ⊒Fˆ M2 ⇐⇒ ∀α ∈ A(M1).Fˆ (α,M1) ⊒ Fˆ (α,M2)
Proposition 5.12.
Let C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 be a verification context.
Let F be a function.
Let Fˆ be the auxiliary function of F .
If F is well-formed in C then:
∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈ A(M).


Fˆ (α, {α}) = ⊥
and
Fˆ (α,M1 ∪M2) = Fˆ (α,M1) ⊓ Fˆ (α,M2)
and
Fˆ (α,M) = pαq, if α /∈ A(M)
See the proof 1.
Proof 1.
F is well-formed in C then we have from the definition :
∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈ A(M).


F (α, {α}) = ⊥
and
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
and
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
(6)
From 6, we have the three following results:
•
F (α, {α}) = ⊥ (7)
From 7 and since L⊒ is a lattice, we have:
pαq ⊓ F (α, {α}) = ⊥ (8)
From 8 and the definition 5.10 of Fˆ we have:
Fˆ (α, {α}) = ⊥ (9)
•
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2) (10)
From 10 and since L⊒ is a lattice we have:
pαq ⊓ F (α,M1 ∪M2) = pαq ⊓ (F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)) (11)
Or else:
pαq ⊓ F (α,M1 ∪M2) = pαq ⊓ F (α,M1) ⊓ pαq ⊓ F (α,M2) (12)
From 12 and from the definition 5.10 of Fˆ we have:
Fˆ (α,M1 ∪M2) = Fˆ (α,M1) ⊓ Fˆ (α,M2) (13)
•
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈M (14)
From 14 and since L⊒ is a lattice and pαq ⊑ ⊤ we have:
pαq ⊓ F (α,M) = pαq, if α /∈ A(M) (15)
From 15 and from the definition 5.10 of Fˆ we have:
Fˆ (α,M) = pαq, if α /∈ A(M) (16)
From 9, 13 and 16 we have:
∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈ A(M).


Fˆ (α, {α} = ⊥
and
Fˆ (α,M1 ∪M2) = Fˆ (α,M1) ⊓ Fˆ (α,M2)
and
Fˆ (α,M) = pαq, if α /∈ A(M)
Proposition 5.13.
Let C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 be a verification context.
Let F be a function.
Let Fˆ the auxiliary function of F .
If F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C then Fˆ is full-invariant-by-intruder in C.
See the proof 2.
Proof 2.
LetM ⊆M andm ∈M such that:
M |=C m (17)
From the definition 5.4 and 17 we have for all α ∈ A(m):
(F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (18)
From 18 we have:
• either:
F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M) (19)
From 19 and since L⊒ is a lattice, we have:
pαq ⊓ F (α,m) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,M) (20)
From 20 and from the definition 5.10 de Fˆ we have:
Fˆ (α,m) ⊒ Fˆ (α,M) (21)
• or:
pK(I)q ⊒ pαq (22)
From 21 and 22 we have for allM ⊆M andm ∈M:
M |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(Fˆ (α,m) ⊒ Fˆ (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq)
Then Fˆ is full-invariant-by-intruder in C.
Lemma 5.14.
Let C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 be a verification context.
Let F be a C-reliable function.
Let p be a protocol.
We have:
If (p is F -increasing in C) then (∀ρ.e ∈ [[p]] we have: e+ ⊒
Fˆ
ρ−)
See the proof 3.
Proof 3.
Since p is an F -increasing protocol in C, then from the definition 5.6 we have:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀σ ∈ Γ : X →Mp(closed) we have:
∀α ∈ A(r+σ).F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ) (23)
Since ρ.e is a valid trace, then exists a substitution σ ∈ Γ, a generalized role R.r ∈ RG(p) and a session
i = S(e) such that:
(Rσ = ρi) ∧ (rσ = e) (24)
From 23 and 24, we have:
∀α ∈ A(e+).F (α, e+) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α, ρi−) (25)
Since L⊒ is a lattice, we have:
∀α ∈ A(e+).pαq ⊓ F (α, e+) ⊒ pαq ⊓ pαq ⊓ F (α, ρi−) (26)
From 26 and since L⊒ is a lattice we have:
∀α ∈ A(e+).pαq ⊓ F (α, e+) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α, ρi−) (27)
From the definition of Fˆ and from 27, we have:
∀α ∈ A(e+).Fˆ (α, e+) ⊒ Fˆ (α, ρi−) (28)
From 28 and the definition of ⊒
Fˆ
, we have:
e+ ⊒
Fˆ
ρi− (29)
Since Use(ρi) ⊆ Use(ρ), from the definition of ⊒
Fˆ
and since L⊒ is a lattice, then we have:
ρi− ⊒
Fˆ
ρ− (30)
From 29 and 30, we deduce that:
e+ ⊒
Fˆ
ρ−
Lemma 5.15.
Let F be a C-reliable function and p a F -increasing protocol.
We have:
∀m ∈M.[[p]] |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
The lemma 5.15 asserts that for any atom α in a message generated by an increasing protocol, its
security level calculated by a reliable function is maintained greater than its initial value in the context,
if the intruder is not initially allowed to know it. Thus, initially the atom has a certain security level.
This value cannot be decreased by the intruder using her initial knowledge and received messages since
reliable functions are full-invariant-by-intruder. In each new step of any valid trace, involved messages
are better protected since the protocol is increasing. The proof is run by induction on the size of the trace
and uses the reliability properties of the function in every step.
See the proof 4
Proof 4.
Let ρ ∈ [[p]] andm ∈M such that:
ρ+ |=C m (31)
Let’s prove the lemma by induction on the size of the trace.
• |ρ|=1.
In this case, we have two sub-cases:
• either ρ+ = ∅, and so we have:
From 31, we have:
∅ |=C m (32)
Since F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C, we have:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ F (α, ∅)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (33)
Since α /∈ ∅ and F is well-formed in C, we have:
F (α, ∅) = ⊤ ⊒ pαq (34)
From 33 and 34, we have:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (35)
• or ρ+ 6= ∅, and so we have:
Since |ρ|=1 then exists an empty trace ε such that ρ = ερ+
Since F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C, we have:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ F (α, ρ+)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (36)
Since p is F -increasing in C, then from the lemma 5.14, we have:
ρ+ ⊒
Fˆ
ε− (37)
Or else:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+).Fˆ (α, ρ+) ⊒ Fˆ (α, ε−) (38)
From 38 and from the definition of Fˆ we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+).F (α, ρ+) ⊓ pαq ⊒ Fˆ (α, ε−) (39)
Since ε is an empty trace and Fˆ is well-formed in C, then:
Fˆ (α, ε−) = pαq (40)
From 39 and 40 we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+).F (α, ρ+) ⊓ pαq ⊒ pαq (41)
Since L⊒ is a lattice, we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+).F (α, ρ+) ⊒ F (α, ρ+) ⊓ pαq (42)
From 41 and 42, we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+).F (α, ρ+) ⊒ pαq (43)
We deduce from 36 and 43:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (44)
• We assume for |ρ| ≤ n, we have:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (45)
Let’s prove that for |ρ| = n+ 1, we have:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (46)
Letm ∈M such that ρ+ |=C m with |ρ| = n+ 1.
Let ρ = ρn.e
Since |ρ| = n+ 1, we have:
|ρn| 6 n and |e| 6 n (47)
From 45 and 47 and since ρ+n |=C ρ
+
n and e
+ |=C e+ we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+n ).(F (α, ρ
+
n ) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (48)
and
∀α ∈ A(e+).(F (α, e+) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (49)
From 48, 49 and since F is well-formed and L⊒ is a lattice we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+n ∪ e
+).(F (α, ρ+n ) ⊓ F (α, e
+) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (50)
Since F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C and ρ+ |=C m, then:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ F (α, ρ+)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (51)
Since:
ρ+ = ρ+n ∪ e
+ (52)
Then from 52 and since L⊒ is a lattice we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+).F (α, ρ+) = F (α, ρ+n ) ⊓ F (α, e
+) (53)
From 50 and 53 we have:
∀α ∈ A(ρ+).(F (α, ρ+) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (54)
From 51 and 54 we have:
∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (55)
From 44, the induction assumption in 45 and from 55, we have: for allm ∈M and all ρ ∈ [[p]]:
ρ |=C m⇒ (∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq))
Or else:
∀m ∈ M.[[p]] |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq)
Theorem 5.16. (Correctness of increasing protocols)
Let F be a C-reliable function and p a F -increasing protocol.
p is C-correct with respect to the secrecy property.
See the proof 5
Proof 5.
Let’s assume that p reveals an atomic secret α.
From the definition 5.7 we have:
∃ρ ∈ [[p]].(ρ |=C α) ∧ (pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq) (56)
Since F is a C-reliable function and p an F -increasing protocol, we have from the lemma 5.15:
(F (α, α) ⊒ pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq) (57)
From 56 and 57, we have:
F (α, α) ⊒ pαq (58)
As F is well-formed in C, then:
F (α, α) = ⊥ (59)
From 58 and 59 we have:
⊥ = pαq (60)
60 is not possible because it is opposite to: pK(I)q 6⊒ pαq in 56.
Then p is C-correct for the property of secrecy.
